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  To Steal or Not to Steal:  
Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation 
 
Abstract 
Data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within-country variation that 
decreases with the strength of investors’ legal protection. A simple model identifies three firm 
attributes related to that variation: investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership 
structure. Using firm-level governance and transparency data in 27 countries, we find that all 
three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices and that 
firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets. All 
relations are stronger in less investor-friendly countries, demonstrating that firms adapt to poor 
legal environments to establish efficient governance practices.  Previous studies show that better legal protection for investors is associated with higher valuation 
of the stock market (La Porta, et al. (2002)), higher valuation of listed firms relative to their assets 
or changes in investments (Wurgler (2000)), and larger listed firms in terms of their sales and 
assets (Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999)). Furthermore, industries and firms in better legal 
regimes rely more on external financing to fund their growth (La Porta, et al. (1997), Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998)).
1 
Although these country-level studies provide valuable insights into the effects of regulatory 
environment, they leave several important questions unanswered. Do all firms in weak legal 
regimes suffer from poor corporate governance and do firms in strong legal regimes practice 
uniformly high-quality governance?  Newly released data on 859 firms in 27 countries reveal 
wide within-country variation in governance and disclosure practices, with the variation 
increasing as legal environment gets less investor-friendly. These phenomena raise new 
questions: Does the wider variation in weaker legal regimes simply reflect greater latitudes 
allowed by lower minimum standards? Or does it reflect firms’ adaptation to poor legal 
environment, as in Coase (1960), resulting in some firms having higher-quality governance than 
is required by law?  If so, is there a systematic pattern in which firms choose their quality of 
governance? What are the relevant firm attributes and how are they related to the observed 
governance practices? Is the quality of governance priced in stock markets, and if so, is it 
economically significant for corporate decision makers to take notice?  
To address these issues, we provide a simple model and test its predictions and related 
conjectures. The model describes how a controlling shareholder may arrive at the optimal level of 
diversion of corporate resources while facing private costs of diversion that increase with the 
strength of legal environment.   
The model predicts that (1) firms with better investment opportunities, higher concentration 
of ownership, and greater needs for external financing practice better governance; (2) firms that 
practice better governance are valued higher; and (3) these relations are stronger in weaker legal 
  1regimes. The basic intuitions are simple.  Profitable investment opportunities matter because one 
is less likely to commit crime if one has something valuable to lose. Ownership concentration 
matters because one does not steal from oneself.  External financing matters because one does not 
spit into the well from which one plans to drink. As for the interplay between firm attributes and 
legal environment, good corporate governance driven by private incentives plays a more 
important role in alleviating the harmful effects of ineffective legal framework when regulation is 
weak. And finally, good corporate governance is valued higher where it is scarce; namely, in 
weaker legal regimes. 
These predictions are tested with data on the quality of corporate governance practice 
compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), while using Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
disclosure data as a robustness check.  The CLSA data rely on an intuitively appealing and 
comprehensive, yet partially subjective method, while S&P scores are objective.  
As predicted by the model, the quality of governance practice is positively related to growth 
opportunities, concentration of cash flow rights, and need for external financing. Furthermore, 
these relations are stronger in less investor-friendly legal environments. Consistent with Coase, 
firms seem to adapt to legal environments to effect efficient governance practices. 
The data also reveal that firms with better governance enjoy higher valuation. One standard 
deviation increase in overall governance score is associated with an increase of a firm’s market 
value by nine percent, on average, with a stronger impact in weaker legal regimes. For example, 
for firms in Mexico, which has the weakest legal framework in our sample, one standard 
deviation increase in governance scores is associated with 13.2 percent increase in market value, 
whereas the same change in a strong legal framework like Hong Kong is associated with only 4.6 
percent increase. These findings are consistent with recent studies based on international data and 
may explain why previous studies on the relation between governance and firm performance 
using U.S. data show mostly mixed results.
2  
  2Section I presents a simple model to provide empirical hypotheses. Empirical design and data 
are described in Section II. Section III reports empirical results, with robustness checks described 
in Section IV. The concluding section contains a summary and implications. 
I. Theoretical Considerations 
We consider an environment similar to Johnson, et al. (2000), Lombardo and Pagano (2002), 
and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), in which controlling shareholders divert corporate resources 
and diversion is costly.  We relate diversion to corporate governance by defining the quality of 
governance as (1-d), where d is the proportion of firm value diverted for private gains. Thus, a 
high level of d implies poor governance practice, where d is broadly defined to include a wide 
range of value-decreasing activities from what Jensen and Meckling (1976) define as excessive 
shirking and corporate perks to outright stealing of tangible and intangible corporate resources.  
This definition of the quality of governance captures various governance and managerial practices 
in place that may or may not be legally binding.  
Diversion is costly to the controlling shareholder. The most obvious costs are fines, jail terms, 
and loss of reputation associated with illegal diversion. Another cost is bribery of employees, 
regulators, and politicians to facilitate and hide diversion. A third cost is the difference between 
the controlling shareholder’s private value of corporate perks or of diverted resources and their 
fair replacement value. These direct costs vary across countries due to differences in regulatory 
environment, with higher costs in countries with stronger legal protection for investors. 
Diversion also incurs opportunity costs if it affects investment decisions.  For example, the 
direct costs of diversion generally are lower when a project is at the idea or business plan stage 
than after the project becomes tangible assets, because it is more difficult to identify and exercise 
property rights of a business idea than of tangible assets. When this cost difference is sufficiently 
large, it may be optimal to divert the project before investments are made.  Such diversion will 
lower the project’s value if it is worth more as a part of the firm – say, due to economic 
dependence with the firm’s existing assets – than elsewhere. 
  3In general, timing of diversion depends on how costs and benefits vary over time, and hence, 
diversion may affect investment decisions. To incorporate such possibilities, we assume that the 
controlling shareholder makes diversion and investment decisions jointly and that the direct costs 
of diversion are linear in the amount diverted. We also consider, in Appendix A, a case in which 
diversion is made after investments as in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) with a convex cost 
function. Both approaches lead to the same set of hypotheses because reductions in project value 
and a linear cost of diversion, combined, have a similar effect on the optimal diversion decision 
as a convex cost. 
A. A Simple Model  
We consider a simple investment opportunity set in a single period, in which investments are 
made at the beginning and returns are realized at the end, when the firm liquidates and the 
controlling shareholder collects her share of liquidating dividends. The interest rate is zero and 
investors are risk-neutral. 
The gross return per unit of capital invested in project j is equal to 1 ) ( j π + , where   
and 
0 ≥ j
) ( j π  is linear and decreasing in j for all firms with each firm having a maximum of  0 > π .  
π varies across firms and is the variable that differentiates the profitability of investment 
opportunities across firms. With these assumptions, the gross return for the j
th unit of capital 
invested can be written as  j j − + = + π π 1 ) ( 1 .  If a firm takes all positive NPV projects, it will 
invest until  1 = − + j 1 π , and the units of capital invested will be  π = j . 
The cost of diversion is assumed to be a constant fraction, c, of the amount diverted.  The 
controlling shareholder owns α fraction of cash flow rights and will divert only when  α − <1 c , 
because one dollar of diversion creates wealth transfer of 1 – α from other shareholders giving 
her a net benefit of 1 – α  – c.  
The controlling shareholder will invest as long as her share of liquidating dividends from a 
project is greater than the after-cost diversion; namely, if  c j − > + 1 )) ( 1 ( π α . Thus she will 
  4invest up to the point where απ () 1 +−= − j 1 c , from which we obtain the controlling 
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.    [1] 
The internal funds available for investments is  0 > + = e F π , where e is a constant indicating 
whether the firm has sufficient funds to invest in all positive NPV projects.
3 The funds remaining 
after the investment, , will be diverted if 
* j F − α − <1 c .  Because  e + F =π , it follows from 
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π α .   [2] 
Dividing  D* by the firm’s endowment, e + π , we obtain our proxy for the quality of 
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.    [3] 
B.  Hypotheses 
Equation [3] specifies how d* is related to the variables of interest, namely, c, α, and π . 
Taking partial derivatives of d* with respect to these variables provides a number of testable 
hypotheses. The most obvious is that d* is negatively related to the cost of diversion c, our proxy 
for the strength of legal environment. Restating the well-known result, 
HYPOTHESIS 1: In stronger legal regimes (higher-c countries), firms will divert less and 
practice higher-quality corporate governance. 
Taking the partial derivative of d* with respect to π , the profitability of investment 





















2 < 0    if   
                              otherwise
  
.   [4] 
This derivative is negative because when investment opportunities are more profitable, the 
controlling shareholder’s personal gains from investments due to her cash flow rights are greater.  
HYPOSTHESIS 2: Controlling shareholders of firms with more profitable investment 
opportunities divert less for private gains and practice higher-quality corporate governance. 
Equation [4] also implies that when a firm suffers a substantial drop in profitable investment 
opportunities, the controlling shareholders will divert more corporate resources. Johnson, et al. 
(2000) document such behavior by Asian firms before the Asian financial crisis. In the U. S., the 
media alleges similar actions by the top management of Enron, Worldcom, and other firms prior 
to their filing bankruptcy. 
The impact of investment opportunities on governance practice may vary across legal 


















2 > 0          if   
                               otherwise
  
.   [5] 
Equation [5] shows that the sensitivity of diversion to investment opportunities falls as the cost of 
diversion rises. In other words, the positive relation between investment opportunities and the 
quality of governance is stronger in weaker legal regimes. The potential loss of value due to 
diversion is greater in weaker legal frameworks and, hence, those with good investment 
opportunities have greater incentives to mitigate it through good governance: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The impact of investment opportunities on the quality of governance practices 
is stronger in a country with weaker legal environment. 





















2 < 0       if   
                              otherwise
  
 .  [6] 
  6This is the well-known Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency argument that entrepreneurs with 
higher ownership divert less, restated as: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Controlling shareholders with greater cash flow rights practice higher quality 
corporate governance. 



















2 > 0          if   
                              otherwise
  
.   [7] 
Equation [7] shows that the sensitivity of diversion to ownership concentration falls as the cost of 
diversion rises. In other words, the positive relation between ownership and the quality of 
governance is stronger in weaker legal regimes. In the absence of adequate legal protection for 
investors, concentrated ownership becomes a more important tool to resolve the agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders.
4 Thus we propose 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The impact of ownership concentration on the quality of governance is greater 
in a weaker legal regime. 
The quality of governance also may be related to external financing. We have already shown 
that firms with profitable investment opportunities will have better corporate governance. If 
profitable investment opportunities lead to more external financing, firms with greater external 
financing are likely to have better corporate governance.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), however, predict the opposite. They argue that 
profitable firms have more internally generated funds and, hence, rely less on external financing. 
Thus we isolate the impact of external financing from that of profitability of investment 
opportunities by assuming that investment is given. We also assume that external financing is 
bounded from above by a minimum level of cash flow rights necessary to maintain the control 
and that new investors rationally anticipate diversion. Under these assumptions, in Appendix B 
we show that firms in greater need for external financing have greater incentives to enhance the 
quality of governance, which leads to 
  7HYPOTHESIS 6:  For a given level of profitable investment opportunities, controlling 
shareholders of firms with greater need for external financing will practice higher-quality 
governance. 
One reason firms in weaker legal regimes have difficulty raising external capital is investors’ 
lack of trust in legal protection of their rights. Since this distrust leads to higher costs of capital, 
firms with external financing needs have incentives to alleviate their concerns by practicing high-
quality governance. The incentives are likely to be greater among firms that suffer more from the 
lack of investor confidence; namely, firms located in weaker legal regimes.  Hence, 
CONJECTURE 1: The positive relation between external financing needs and the quality of 
governance is stronger in a weaker legal environment. 
Finally, we examine the relation between the quality of governance and a firm’s market-to-
book value ratio, Q, defined as the ratio of  the present value of gross returns from projects to the 

































.   [8] 
Equation [8] shows that Q increases as d* decreases; thus,  
HYPOTHESIS 7: Firms with high-quality governance are valued higher. 
Because high-quality governance is relatively scarce in weak legal regimes, everything else 
being equal, the few firms with good governance are likely to be valued more in poor legal 
environments. Thus,  
CONJECTURE 2: The impact of the quality of governance on firm valuation is greater in weaker 
legal regimes.  
II. Empirical Design and Data 
A. Regression Specification 
To test the hypotheses and conjectures concerning relations between governance and firm 
attributes, we regress individual firms’ corporate governance scores on measures of investment 
  8opportunities, external financing needs, ownership concentration, and legal environment, 
controlling for industry and other firm characteristics. Specifically, we estimate the following 
cross-sectional country random-effects regression:  
CORP GOV INV OPP EXT FIN OWN CASH LEGAL
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where CORP_GOV is corporate governance or transparency scores; α, a constant; INV_OPP, 
investment opportunities; EXT_FIN, the need for external financing; OWN_CASH, concentration 
of cash flow rights; and LEGAL, the strength of a country’s legal regime. Interaction terms 
INV_OPP*LEGAL, EXT_FIN*LEGAL, and OWN_CASH*LEGAL are those of legal regime with 
investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership concentration, respectively. And Zs 
are control variables; d, industry dummy; c, country; i, industry; j, firm; K, the number of control 
variables; and I, the number of industries.  
Specification [S1] is estimated by two separate regressions: one with INV_OPP and 
EXT_FIN, and another with OWN_CASH as independent variables. These variables are separated 
for two reasons. First, using all three variables in the same regression substantially reduces the 
sample size because ownership data are not available for a substantial part of our sample. Second, 
using all three as independent variables in addition to their interaction terms with LEGAL may 
create a multi-collinearity problem. 
We estimate these regressions using country random-effects to take into account that 
observations on individual firms in a given country are not independent and that errors among 
observations are correlated. Country random-effects specification is supported by the Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) test, which strongly rejects the hypothesis that the variation of random effects is 
zero. Moreover, our sample consists only of a sub-sample of the total population of countries and, 
thus, a random-effects specification is preferable (Greene (1997)).  
  9To investigate the relation between firm valuation and corporate governance, we again 
control for strength of legal environment, industry, and firm characteristics and estimate the 
following cross-sectional regression using country random-effects: 
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The inferences one can draw from these regressions are limited because of endogeneity and 
other econometric problems. To reduce endogeneity, we exercise care in choosing proxies for key 
variables and sample periods. For example, our measure of EXT_FIN is a projected need for 
external financing, not an outcome-based measure. We also choose different time periods to 
estimate the dependent and independent variables in [S1] and [S2]. In addition, we conduct 
various robustness checks for sample selection, endogeneity, regression model specification, and 
alternative definitions of main variables, which are described in Section IV. 
B. Data 
B.1. Corporate Governance and Transparency 
B.1.1. CLSA Governance Scores.  In March 2001, CLSA issued a report on governance practices 
by 494 companies in 24 countries providing scores on the quality of governance in year 2000. 
Firms are selected based on size (large) and investor interest (high). The governance scores are 
based on responses from financial analysts to 57 questions that are used to construct scores on a 1 
to 100 scale, where a higher number indicates better governance. According to CLSA, 70 percent 
of the scores are based on objective information and all questions have binary answers (yes/no) to 
minimize analysts’ subjectivity.
5  
CLSA groups the scores on the 57 questions into six categories of governance and an index 
of social responsibility: discipline (managerial incentives and discipline towards value 
maximizing actions), transparency (timely and accurate disclosure), independence (board 
independence),  accountability (board accountability), responsibility (enforcement and 
  10management accountability), protection (minority shareholder protection), and social awareness 
(social responsibility). We compute the composite governance index, COMP, by taking a simple 
average of the first six categories. 
Three different scores are used as a proxy for CORP_GOV: the composite index, COMP; 
investor protection, PROTECT; and social awareness, SOCIAL. Of the six CLSA governance 
categories, we single out PROTECT because it is the most direct measure of investor protection 
against theft and, hence, is more relevant to ownership concentration than COMP.  Ownership 
concentration is hypothesized to help improve investor protection; however, there is no obvious 
reason to expect firms with more concentrated ownership to disclose more and be more 
transparent. Since COMP also includes measures of transparency and other governance categories 
in addition to investor protection, we expect OWN_CASH to be more closely related to 
PROTECT than to COMP. Social awareness is examined separately because it is distinct from 
(has low correlations with) other governance categories and corporate social responsibility 
receives much public attention. 
B.1.2. Standard & Poor’s Transparency Scores.  As a robustness check, we use Standard & 
Poor’s measure of corporate disclosure practices for 573 companies in 16 emerging markets and 
three developed countries in 2000. The measure counts whether a firm discloses relevant 
information on 91 possible items that would be of interest to investors: 22 items on ownership 
structure and investor relations (ownership), 34 items on accounting and financial policies 
(disclosure), and 35 items on board and management structure and process (board). These counts 
become scores ranging from 0 to 22 for ownership, from 0 to 34 for disclosure, and from 0 to 35 
for board. We add the scores of the three categories to create an aggregate transparency score, 
TRAN, ranging from 0 to 91, which is equivalent to assigning an equal weight to each disclosed 
item. 
We interpret these scores as an indicator of the quality of disclosure practice. If a firm has 
more disclosure on ownership-related items, for example, we infer the firm has less to hide and 
  11hence has relatively sound practices on matters concerning ownership structure.  The advantage 
of S&P scores lies in their objectivity; however, they depend only on the number of disclosures 
and do not reflect disclosure content. They are best viewed as a measure of transparency and not a 
comprehensive measure of corporate governance. 
B.1.3. Consistency across CLSA and S&P Scores.  To determine whether companies scored high 
on corporate governance by CLSA are also scored high on disclosure by S&P, we identify 208 
companies that are ranked by both agencies. For these firms the CLSA composite index, COMP, 
is significantly correlated with S&P aggregate score, TRAN, with a Spearman rank-order 
correlation of 0.20 with p-value = 0.00.  To check whether the correlation is due to country and 
industry differences, we regress COMP on TRAN with country and industry dummies. The 
relation remains significant, confirming the consistency between the two rankings.
6 
Although scores on many individual categories of the CLSA ranking are not correlated with 
those of S&P ranking, the correlations are positive and significant when the individual categories 
are measured on overlapping characteristics. For instance, S&P score on disclosure is 
significantly correlated with CLSA score on transparency; S&P score on board is significantly 
correlated with CLSA score on board accountability, and so on. These correlations, as well as the 
lack thereof, suggest that S&P scores provide valuable data to check the robustness of results 
based on CLSA scores. 
B.2. Legal Environment 
Our measure of the strength of legal environment is based on both de jure and de facto 
aspects of regulation. The de jure measure of investor protection, INVESTOR, is the anti-director 
rights (shareholder rights) index defined in La Porta, et al. (1998a) and extended by Claessens, 
Djankov, and Nenova (1999), and Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000).  It ranges from 0 to 6. We 
cannot rely solely on this measure, however, because countries such as India and Pakistan score 
the highest in our sample (5), but do not have the best de facto investor protection. To measure 
the strength of de facto regulation, ENFORCE, we use the 1999-to-2000 monthly average of the 
  12rule of law index, the assessment of the law and order tradition from the International Country 
Risk Guide. The rule of law assesses the law and order tradition of a country on a scale from 0 to 
10. 
There is little correlation between de jure and de facto measures of regulation. The 
correlation coefficient between INVESTOR and ENFORCE is 0.18 with p-value = 0.38.  To 
construct a measure that reflects both aspects of regulation, we multiply INVESTOR by 
ENFORCE and define it LEGAL. As a robustness check, we also define LEGAL as the sum of the 
two. 
Table I provides summary statistics by country for legal regime variables, CLSA composite 
scores, and S&P aggregate scores.  
[Table I here] 
Our sample covers a broad range of legal regimes with LEGAL scores ranging from 3.33 
(Mexico) to 41.65 (Hong Kong and Chile). Both CLSA and S&P scores reveal wide within-
country variation: For CLSA, the average spread between maximums and minimums for 
countries with more than two firms is 38.46 against the mean score of 47.03; for S&P, the 
average spread is 29.56 against the mean of 34.37.
7 The data also reveal greater variation in 
governance practices in weaker legal regimes.
8 
B.3. Firm Variables 
Because much of the firm-level data originate from financial statements and accounting 
practices that vary across countries, it is difficult to directly compare the data. However, one of 
the key distinguishing characteristics in legal regimes is accounting standards; thus, the legal 
regime variable controls, to some extent, for their differences. Additionally, industry dummies 
help control for different accounting practices across industries. Any remaining noise would 
weaken the power of our tests. Most of the firm-level data are obtained from Worldscope.  
Variables are measured in U.S. dollars. 
  13B.3.1. Investment Opportunities, External Financing, Ownership, and Valuation.  To measure 
investment opportunities, INV_OPP, we rely on past growth in sales because it is less affected 
than earnings by diversion, manipulation, and different accounting rules. We estimate a two-year 
geometric average of annual percentage growth in net sales from 1998 to 2000, and winsorize it 
at the 1
st and 99
th percentile to reduce the impact of outliers. 
In estimating the need for external financing, EXT_FIN, we avoid an outcome-based measure 
to reduce endogeneity. We use an estimate of projected need for outside capital employed in 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). It defines external financing need as the difference 
between the firm’s actual growth rate and the sustainable growth rate with retained earnings and 
short-term and long-term debt financing that maintain a constant debt to assets ratio. We estimate 
a firm’s actual growth rate as a two-year geometric average of annual growth rate in total assets 
from 1998 to 2000, and the sustainable growth rate as a two-year average of ROE/(1-ROE).
9  
For ownership concentration, we measure concentration of cash flow rights, OWN_CASH, as 
the share of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder in 1996 as defined in Claessens, et al. 
(2002). Data on cash flow and control rights are obtained from data sets constructed by Larry 
Lang and Mara Faccio, parts of which were previously used in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(2000) and Claessens, et al. (2002). The data overlap our sample for 173 and 240 firms in 12 and 
11 countries for CSLA and S&P samples, respectively.  
We define ownership wedge, WEDGE, as a dummy variable equal to one if control rights 
exceed cash flow rights by at least ten percent (19.3 percent of the sample firms) and zero, 
otherwise.  The results do not change when WEDGE is defined by a five percent difference. A ten 
percent cutoff point is used to determine whether the largest shareholder has effective control 
over intermediate and final corporations in the chain of control.
10  
Firm valuation is measured as the 2000-to-2001, two-year average of Tobin’s Q. As in La 
Porta, et al. (2002) and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), we define Tobin’s Q as the sum of 
  14total assets plus the market value of equity less book value of equity, over total assets. The market 
value of equity is the number of common shares outstanding, times the year-end price.  
As stated earlier, we separate time periods during which dependent and independent variables 
are measured to reduce endogeneity. Specifically, we use 2000 to 2001 to estimate two-year 
average Q, 2000 CLSA and S&P scores for CORP_GOV, and 1998 to 2000 to calculate two-year 
averages for INV_OPP and EXT_FIN, and 1996 for cash flow and control rights.  
B.3.2. Control variables.  Industry dummies (di) are included in regressions to account for 
differences in asset structure, accounting practice, government regulation, and competitiveness, 
each of which may affect corporate governance and firm valuation. We classify two-digit SIC 
industries into 13 groups as in Campbell (1996).
11 
Firm size, SIZE, is defined as the logarithm of sales. We use sales because they are less 
sensitive to differences in accounting standards across countries. Because larger firms tend to 
attract more attention and may be under greater scrutiny by the public, size may affect 
governance structure. Size also proxies for firm age; older and larger firms tend to have higher 
book-to-market value ratio. 
Research and development expenditure scaled by sales, R&D, is used to control for 
differences in intangibility of corporate resources, which may be related to cost of diversion. For 
example, intangible assets are harder to monitor and easier to steal. Thus a firm with a greater 
proportion of intangibles may adopt stricter governance standards. Companies with high R&D 
expenditures also tend to be high-growth firms and may enjoy high valuation.  
Export intensity, EXPORT, is defined as sales revenue generated from shipping merchandise 
to foreign countries, scaled by sales. This measure is used to control for differences in exposure to 
globalization pressures in the product market. Companies that conduct more business globally 
may feel more pressure to conform their governance to global standards (Khanna, Kogan, and 
Palepu (2002)). Variables SIZE, R&D, and EXPORT are constructed as two-year averages during 
1999-2000. 
  15If a firm has all variables except R&D and EXPORT, we set those two variables equal to zero; 
that is, we assume they are not reported because R&D spending or sales generated through export 
are negligible. Dropping companies with missing data for R&D may bias our sample towards 
technology-oriented firms. As a robustness check, we follow Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 
(1999) and use two dummy variables, which take values of one when a firm does not report R&D 
or export. These dummies control for the possibility that non-reporting firms are different from 
reporting firms. 
Some variables may not be directly comparable if firms use different methods to account for 
their subsidiaries. For example, the measure of Q may be distorted when partially owned 
subsidiaries are treated as fully owned in consolidation of financial statements. Consolidation 
may also affect our estimates of sales growth rate and external financing needs. La Porta, et al. 
(2002) make adjustments for the potential distortion and compare unadjusted Q with the 
consolidation-adjusted Q. They find a correlation of 0.83 between the two measures and conclude 
the distortion is not material enough to base their statistical results on adjusted Q. We control for 
the effects of consolidation by adding a dummy equal to one if a firm consolidates, and zero 
otherwise. The dummy also controls for the possibility that consolidation makes the combined 
entity more transparent. As a robustness check we repeat our regressions on a sub-sample of firms 
that fully consolidate their financial statements. 
Finally, ADR dummy variable is included to control for listing on U.S. stock exchanges. 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) provide evidence that ADR-listed foreign firms are valued 
higher. Since ADR-listed firms are more likely to have high-quality accounting standards, we 
expect  ADR to be correlated with the CLSA governance and S&P transparency scores. The 
dummy variable is equal to one if a firm’s shares or its ADRs are listed on U. S. exchanges in 
either 1999 or 2000 (15.9 percent of the sample) and zero, otherwise. We do not include privately 
placed ADRs through Rule 144a and ‘Over-the-Counter’ stocks. 
C.  Sample Construction 
  16We follow the usual practice of excluding financial institutions because of their unique 
financial structure, regulatory requirements, and accounting standards. There are occasionally 
slight differences in the way company names appear in the CLSA, S&P, and Worldscope data 
sets. In such cases we confirm their identity with the Internet Securities, Inc. (ISI) Emerging 
Markets database. We drop four CLSA firms and one S&P firm from samples because the 
ambiguity cannot be resolved, leaving 384 and 456 firms in the CLSA and S&P samples, 
respectively. Sample sizes are reduced further when relevant variables for each regression are 
unavailable from Worldscope: 40 CLSA and 17 S&P companies are dropped when INV_OPP and 
EXT_FIN enter as independent variables in [S1], and another is dropped from the S&P sample 
when Tobin’s Q is used. 
III. Empirical Results  
In this section we first report country random-effects regression results on the relation 
between CLSA or S&P scores with the three firm attributes and legal environment. Then we 
report results on the relation between firm valuation and the governance or transparency scores. 
A. Relation between Governance and Firm Attributes 
A.1 Investment Opportunities and External Financing 
Table II reports the results of regression [S1] with INV_OPP and EXT_FIN as independent 
variables and COMP, PROTECT, TRAN and SOCIAL as measures of the quality of governance. 
[Table II here] 
The results are supportive of our hypotheses. Both investment opportunities and external 
financing are significantly positively related to the composite index and investor protection. The 
strength of legal regimes, LEGAL, is also positively related to both scores. The coefficients on 
COMP indicate that one standard deviation increase in growth rates (INV_OPP) increases the 
governance score by 4.86, a 9.97 percent increase over the sample mean of 48.74, while the same 
increase in external financing needs raises COMP by 2.13, a 4.37 percent increase. 
  17The interaction terms of legal regime with investment opportunities and external financing 
for COMP and PROTECT show negative coefficients, and three of four are significant. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that positive relations for investment opportunities and 
external financing are stronger in weaker legal environments. The results with the S&P score, 
TRAN, as the dependent variable also are largely consistent with those of the CLSA scores. 
When social awareness is used as the dependent variable, however, none of the independent 
variables of interest are significant, except external financing which shows a negative sign. There 
is no evidence that firms are more socially responsible when they have better investment 
opportunities or need more external financing. 
Results on ADR and consolidation dummies also are revealing. ADR listing seems to be 
positively related to firms’ overall governance practices, but not with investor protection. This 
lack of relation between ADR and investor protection is consistent with Siegel’s (2003) finding 
that investors of ADR listed firms do not benefit from U.S. securities regulation. The 
consolidation dummy shows a similar pattern. Its coefficient is positive and significant for the 
composite score, but is driven mainly through transparency. This result confirms the notion that 
firms consolidating their financial statements tend to be more transparent.  Finally, SIZE is 
significantly positively related to COMP and TRAN but negatively related to PROTECT, which 
suggests that larger firms tend to have better disclosure practices, but not better investor 
protection.  
A.2. Ownership 
The regressions of [S1] with ownership concentration also contain the OWN_CASH
2 term to 
account for possible non-linearity between ownership concentration and corporate governance as 
in McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999). It also contains 
WEDGE to account for differences in cash flow rights and control rights.  
As mentioned earlier, the sample size for ownership data is small to start with, and becomes 
even smaller when we exclude financial firms. Without financial firms we have only 124 and 177 
  18firms, an average of ten and 16 firms per country, for CLSA and S&P samples, respectively. To 
alleviate this small sample size problem, we add back financial firms and estimate [S1] with a 
financial industry dummy variable. The results are reported in Panel A of Table III. Panel B 
reports results without the financial firms. 
[Table III here] 
Panel A shows a significant positive coefficient on cash flow rights, OWN_CASH, and a 
significant negative coefficient on OWN_CASH
2 for both COMP and PROTECT, suggesting that 
corporate governance improves with the concentration of cash flow rights but at a decreasing rate. 
This is consistent with earlier findings of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), who argue that greater ownership concentration by insiders may align their 
interests with those of minority shareholders, but it also may result in a greater degree of 
managerial entrenchment. 
The coefficients for WEDGE and the interaction term between OWN_CASH and LEGAL are 
negative and significant when investor protection score, PROTECT, is used as the dependent 
variable. Thus investor protection appears to improve with the concentration of cash flow rights 
but decreases as the controlling shareholder acquires more control rights in excess of her cash 
flow rights. Furthermore, the positive relation between investor protection and cash flow rights is 
stronger in weaker legal regimes. This is consistent with our hypothesis that in weaker legal 
regimes concentrated ownership of cash flow rights serves as a more important tool to resolve 
agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. 
The magnitudes of the coefficients also indicate the effects are economically significant. For 
PROTECT, one standard deviation increase in cash flow rights increases the score by 12.67, a 
21.02 percent increase relative to the 60.27 sample mean, while increasing control rights by ten 
percent above cash flow rights decreases the score by 8.64.  
When we use S&P transparency scores as the dependent variable all the coefficients have the 
right signs but most lose significance. This is not surprising because as stated earlier, there is no 
  19reason to expect firms with concentrated ownership to disclose more. The weaker results for 
COMP  relative to PROTECT  also may be due to the inclusion of transparency and other 
governance attributes that are not directly related to agency problems. Finally, regressions 
excluding financial firms (Panel B) show weaker results because of smaller sample sizes; 
however, the signs of coefficients are mostly in the right direction.  The results with PROTECT 
are the strongest, as expected. 
In sum, the regression estimates of [S1] suggest that not only the legal environment matters, 
but growth opportunities, external financing, and ownership concentration also matter in a firm’s 
choice of governance practice. More important, these firm-specific factors matter more as the 
legal environment becomes less investor-friendly. 
B.  Relation between Valuation and Governance  
To investigate the relation between governance and firm valuation, we estimate regression 
specification [S2] with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Independent variables are CLSA or 
S&P scores, legal regime, an interaction term of legal regime with corporate governance or 
disclosure scores, past sales growth, firm size, R&D expenditures, export, ADR and consolidation 
dummies, and industry dummies. Past sales growth is added to control for a possible spurious 
relation between governance and valuation because growth opportunities – proxied by sales 
growth – are related to both valuation and corporate governance. 
Table IV reports results based on CLSA and S&P scores, where the coefficients on 
CORP_GOV and its interaction term with LEGAL are multiplied by 100.  
[Table IV here] 
Consistent with our hypothesis, firms with higher-quality corporate governance are valued 
higher. The CLSA composite score is positively related to firm valuation, as are measures of 
investor protection and transparency. These results are significant both statistically and 
economically. The coefficient on COMP indicates that one standard deviation increase in the 
overall governance score is associated with an increase in Q by 0.17, a nine percent increase 
  20relative to the sample average of 1.89. The social awareness score, however, again shows no 
relation to valuation, providing no evidence that investors value corporate social responsibility as 
defined by CLSA. 
The quality of legal environment, LEGAL, also has the expected positive sign, consistent with 
the findings of La Porta, et al. (2002) that firms located in better legal environments enjoy higher 
valuation. However, when it enters the regression with either CLSA or S&P scores (Panel A), its 
coefficient becomes insignificant. Only when the same regression is estimated without 
governance or transparency scores (Panel B), does the LEGAL coefficient become significant. 
Apparently, individual firms’ governance and transparency scores contain relevant information 
on firm valuation that is not revealed by a country’s legal framework.  
The interaction term with LEGAL has the expected negative sign for COMP, PROTECT, and 
TRAN, and is significant for two out of three, consistent with our conjecture that the positive 
relation between governance and valuation is weaker in stronger legal regimes. The coefficient on 
the interaction term for COMP indicates that in a weak legal regime such as Mexico (LEGAL = 
3.33), one standard deviation increase in the governance score is associated with an increase in Q 
by 0.24, a 13.2 percent increase relative to the average Q of 1.80 for Mexican firms. In a strong 
legal regime like Hong Kong (LEGAL = 41.65), the same increase in the governance score is 
associated with an increase in Q by 0.11, only a 4.6 percent increase relative to the average Q of 
2.41 for firms in Hong Kong.  
This helps explain why previous studies based on U.S. data show mixed results on the 
relation between firm valuation and corporate governance: U.S. firms are subject to one of the 
strongest legal frameworks worldwide. 
Most of the control variables are of expected sign and highly significant. Firms with high 
growth opportunities are valued higher as are firms of smaller size, greater R&D expenditures, 
and more export orientation. The results also show no incremental ADR effect on firm valuation 
beyond the corporate governance and disclosure scores.
12 Finally, the significant negative 
  21coefficients on the consolidation dummy are consistent with our suspicion that consolidation 
biases Tobin’s Q downward. 
IV. Robustness 
Our results remain robust to a battery of checks on sample selection, endogeneity, regression 
model specification, alternative definitions of main variables, and outliers. 
A. Sample Selection 
As stated earlier, CLSA and S&P select firms based on size and investor interest, which 
subjects our results to a sample selection problem. We address the size problem by repeating 
regressions in Tables II, III, and IV using the Heckman (1979) two-step selection model. We find 
virtually no change in the magnitude or the significance of the coefficients and therefore conclude 
the results are robust to the sample selection problem.
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B. Endogeneity 
Although our results are consistent with the predictions of the model, there is an endogeneity 
problem in the regression analyses. In specification [S1] it is possible that good corporate 
governance leads to greater investment opportunities rather than greater investment opportunities 
leading to good governance practice. Another plausible story is that companies that enjoy greater 
sales growth tend to be rated higher by CLSA, the reason why all the tests also are conducted 
with S&P data that are free from such subjectivity. Endogeneity is of less concern regarding 
external financing because our variable is the projected need, not outcome-based. We also are less 
concerned with ownership concentration because it is hard, at least for us, to build a plausible 
scenario of how good investor protection leads to more concentrated ownership.  
In Specification [S2] firm governance and valuation may be related because high-value 
stocks in emerging markets attract international investors and greater foreign ownership may lead 
to better governance. One may also argue that analysts assign higher governance scores to firms 
that enjoy high valuation rather than corporate governance being priced in the stock market. 
  22However, the results with S&P data are free from such subjectivity and it is not obvious why 
higher valuation would lead to more disclosure. 
To address the unresolved endogeneity issues, we estimate [S1] and [S2] as a system of 
simultaneous equations using a three-stage least squares method.
14 While this estimation 
technique allows for endogeneity between governance and valuation, we need to identify some 
exogenous parameters that affect only governance or valuation, but not both. Identifying truly 
exogenous parameters is difficult; therefore, the results presented below must be interpreted with 
caution.  
In the three-stage least squares estimation, the governance equation contains COMP, 
PROTECT, or TRAN, as the dependent variable, and Q as a simultaneously determined variable. 
We use the same set of control parameters used in Table II excluding industry dummies and 
interaction terms. Although not reported, the coefficients on industry dummies are jointly 
insignificant in regressions reported in Table II suggesting that R&D expenditures, export 
intensity, and size in the governance equation control for differences in tangibility and other 
industry characteristics that may affect governance. Thus, we assume that industry classification 
does not affect governance but does affects valuation.  
The governance equation also controls for firms’ ALPHA (as in Lins (2003)) and BETA (as in 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Lins (2003)) values in Worldscope.  Values for ALPHA and 
BETA are computed over 23 and 35 consecutive month-end percentage price changes relative to a 
local market index during years from 1999 to 2001. To the extent that ALPHA proxies for excess 
returns, higher ALPHA values may make the controlling shareholder more willing to practice 
good governance. If higher market risk, proxied by BETA, provides better opportunities for the 
controlling shareholder to profit from inside information, high BETA may be negatively related to 
the quality of governance.
15 
The valuation equation contains Q as the dependent variable, governance or disclosure scores 
as a simultaneously determined variable, and the same control parameters as the governance 
  23equation, adding industry dummies and excluding EXT_FIN, SIZE, ALPHA, and BETA. As in 
previous studies (see Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Lins (2003)), we assume that ALPHA 
and  BETA affect governance but not valuation. We also assume that SIZE has no further 
incremental effect on valuation after controlling for R&D expenditures and growth opportunities 
(see Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) for possible justifications). 
Table V reports three-stage estimation results for COMP (Panel A), PROTECT (Panel B), and 
TRAN (Panel C).  
[Table V here] 
The results are consistent with those reported in Tables II and IV. Both INV_OPP and 
EXT_FIN are positively and significantly related to governance and disclosure practices in all 
panels, except INV_OPP in Panel B, which shows the right sign but is not significant. 
Furthermore, CORP_GOV is positive and significant in valuation equations in all panels.  
Therefore, to the extent that three-stage least squares estimation controls for simultaneity 
between governance and valuation, we conclude that companies with better investment 
opportunities and greater need for external financing practice better governance and disclose 
more, in turn leading to higher valuation. 
C. Alternative Variables and Regression Specifications 
Our results are also robust to alternative definitions of independent variables and to added 
control variables. As an alternative proxy for the strength of legal environment, we define LEGAL 
as the sum of INVESTOR and ENFORCE. The results are robust to this definition.  Because using 
the sum of the two is equivalent to imposing a restriction that the coefficients on two variables are 
equal, we also enter INVESTOR and ENFORCE separately. The only noticeable change is that in 
both [S1] and [S2] the interaction term on ENFORCE is significant while that on INVESTOR is 
not, suggesting that de facto regulation captures the strength of legal framework better than de 
jure investor protection.  
  24Additionally, following the principal component analysis outlined in Berkowitz, Pistor, and 
Richard (2003) we combine investor and creditor protection to construct a single capital 
providers’ protection index.  For enforcement, we combine efficiency of the judicial system, rule 
of law, absence of corruption, risk of expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation to derive a 
single index. (See La Porta, et al. (1998a) for definitions of these variables.) The results remain 
unchanged.  
As another robustness check, we control for the tangibility of assets, defined as the ratio of 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by sales (PPE). Although not reported, when we include 
this control variable in [S1], its coefficient is negative for all specifications and significant when 
COMP is used as the dependent variable. This raises the possibility that firms with a higher 
proportion of tangible assets tend to establish weaker governance mechanisms because fixed 
assets are easier to monitor and harder to divert.  The coefficient on PPE in [S2] is significantly 
negative for all specifications, indicating that firms with relatively more fixed assets tend to be 
valued less. 
Our investment opportunities are measured by past growth in sales. When we replace it with 
a more direct measure of investment profitability, return on invested capital as defined by 
Worldscope, our results do not change. As mentioned earlier, we instrument current values of 
INV_OPP and EXT_FIN by their lagged values to reduce endogeneity. Using contemporaneous 
measures does not change our findings. The findings also remain valid when we include a dummy 
variable equal to one when R&D or export data is missing. 
CLSA measure of investor protection, PROTECT, contains one company scoring zero 
(minimum possible) and six scoring 100 (maximum possible).  Because this score is truncated, a 
limited dependent variable approach (Tobit regression) may be more appropriate for Specification 
[S1]. The results in Tables II and III do not change if we use Tobit regression. 
Finally, consolidation may affect the variables in a non-trivial way, making the comparison 
across firms problematic. Although we include the consolidation dummy in all regressions, we 
  25repeat regressions for the sub-sample of firms that fully consolidate their financial statements (78 
percent and 87 percent in CLSA and S&P samples, respectively). This reduces both the sample 
size and the variation in LEGAL. In spite of this, overall results are similar, although the results 
on the interaction terms with LEGAL become weaker.
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V. Summary and Implications 
This paper documents that a firm’s choice of governance and disclosure practices is 
positively related to growth opportunities, need for external financing, and concentration of cash 
flow rights. The positive relations are stronger in countries with weaker legal frameworks.   
Apparently, firms in weaker legal frameworks improve governance practices more in the 
presence of good investment opportunities, as do firms with greater external financing needs to 
overcome the deleterious effects of poor legal protection on their ability to raise external capital. 
Furthermore, ownership concentration appears to be a more important tool to resolve agency 
conflict between controlling and minority shareholders when investor protection is weaker. 
These results have implications for the debate concerning the Coase (1960) argument. While 
our results confirm the La Porta, et al. (1998a) basic thesis that law matters for corporate 
governance, firms seem to adapt to poor legal frameworks to establish efficient governance 
practices.
17 
We also find that the quality of governance and disclosure practices are positively related to 
firm valuation. In addition, the positive relation is weaker in stronger legal regimes. This may 
explain why previous studies based on U.S. data show mixed results, because U.S. legal 
framework for investor protection is one of the strongest in the world. 
Consistent with previous findings, we find the strength of legal framework and firm values 
are positively related. However, the positive relation becomes insignificant when the scores on 
governance and transparency are added to the regression. The dominance of the individual firms’ 
scores over the strength of legal framework is somewhat surprising, yet lends credence to these 
scores as measures of the quality of governance and disclosure practices. 
  26One governance category that consistently shows no relation to firm attributes or to firm 
valuation is social awareness. It seems as if firms do not become more socially responsible when 
they have better growth opportunities, need more external financing, or have higher ownership 
concentration, perhaps because they believe social responsibility is not important to investors. 
Indeed, we find no evidence that investors value what CLSA defines as social awareness—child 
labor practices, political legitimacy, environmental responsibility, equal employment policy, and 
ethical behavior. These social responsibility criteria are contentious. For example, economists 
debate whether child labor in low-income economies is damaging to those societies as the 
alternatives could be starvation, prostitution, or drug peddling. 
Our results imply that economic policies play an important role in guiding firms toward good 
governance practices. Policy makers often debate the merits of pro-growth versus distribution 
oriented policies. One important consequence they must consider in this debate is that pro-growth 
policies generate more profitable investment opportunities and stimulate external financing needs 
of corporations. Both of these conditions provide controlling shareholders incentives to improve 
governance practices. In contrast, distribution oriented policies tend to weaken property rights, 
reducing the incentives to increase cash flow rights for controlling shareholders. Any tax increase 
for redistribution purposes also decreases the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Such 
reductions in cash flow rights increase agency conflicts and may weaken investor protection.  
Our results also have implications for the debate on whether globalization leads to 
convergence in corporate governance (see Bebchuk and Roe (1999), Coffee (1999), Berglöf and 
von Thadden (2000), Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu (2002)). With the increasing globalization of 
trade and capital flows, national boundaries and legal jurisdictions are becoming less effective in 
defining corporate behavior, making individual firm attributes more relevant in shaping corporate 
governance. Thus, the real issue is not whether globalization leads to convergence but how 
globalization affects individual firms’ growth opportunities, external financing needs, ownership 
  27concentration, and individual countries’ economic policies, all of which may vary across firms 
and countries. 
Finally, caveats are in order. Although we have attempted to address endogeneity, a full 
treatment requires time-series analyses of changes in corporate governance practices, a task we 
plan to pursue upon sufficient accumulation of data over time. On the theoretical level, we are 
able to identify three firm attributes related to corporate governance; however, further research 
may reveal the existence of other variables of greater importance. 
  28Appendix A.  A Model with Diversion Occurring after Investments 
If the controlling shareholder diverts resources after investments are made, she will take all positive 
NPV projects because it will increase both her share of liquidating dividends and the amount of diversion.  
Thus the pre-diversion value of the firm is  2 / ) 1 ( 2
0 π π π
π
+ = − + =∫ dj j Π . Her decision is then to 
maximize α (1−d) Π +  d Π − C, where C is the total dollar cost of diversion.  
We assume C is convex in both the fraction, d, and the pre-diversion value of the firm Π. Previous 
authors have assumed a convex cost function in d (e.g., Johnson, et al. (2000), Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002), and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003)), with the rationale that hiding larger amounts of diversion 
gets increasingly harder as diversion increases. Notice that the amount of diversion is a function of both 
the fraction d and the size of the firm. Thus we assume C = c , where p > 1. Another justification 
for this assumption is that larger firms tend to attract more investor interest and hence are under greater 
public scrutiny. 
p d ) ( Π
Solving for the first order condition with this cost function, we obtain: 
() 1 1 0 −− − = α ΠΠ pcd p p ,       [ A 1 ]  
where the marginal benefit of diversion, (1-α), the minority shareholders’ wealth loss, is equal to the 
marginal cost. The second order condition is satisfied because −− − < pp c d p p () 1 2 0 Π . From the first 
order condition we obtain the optimal diversion: 
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Taking the partial and cross partial derivatives with respect to π , c, and α, we obtain: 
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.    [A6] 
Equations [A3] through [A6] are consistent with Equations [4] through [7]. Finally, the market-to-
book value ratio,  π / ) 1 Π − d ( , is decreasing in d*. Therefore, we obtain Hypotheses 1 through 5, and 7 
stated in the text. 
 
Appendix B. Relation between External Financing and Corporate Governance 
Consider a firm that has decided to invest I but has no assets or internal funds to finance it. The firm’s 
value derives solely from the market value, MV, of the project requiring I. The controlling shareholder 
owns α fraction of the firm and finances the project by selling 1-β fraction of the firm to new investors. 
The firm must raise I/(1-d) such that when the controlling shareholder diverts dI/(1-d), the firm will be 
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Differentiating [B3] with respect to d,


















2 ().        [ B 4 ]  
Because diversion takes place only when c < 1 – α, equation [B4] is non-negative.  That is, if the 
controlling shareholder diverts, she has an incentive to maximize d. As can be seen from equation [B2], 
  30however, increasing d means the controlling shareholder must sell a greater fraction of the firm, 
decreasing her ownership of the firm, αβ. Because she will lose control of the firm when β falls below a 
certain point, the maximum fraction of the firm she sells to new investors is bounded by a minimum βmin, 
below which the controlling shareholder loses the control of the firm.
19   Substituting βmin into equation 
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Because I determines the amount of external financing needed, taking partial derivative of d* with respect 
to I, 
























  .    [B6] 
Thus, the need for external financing is inversely related to d*. 
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FOOTNOTES  
1 Rajan and Zingales (2003) also document substantial reversals in financial developments, which cannot be 
attributed directly to differences in legal origin.  They argue rent-seeking incumbents oppose financial 
development, and explain the time-series variation by describing how the legal system affects interest group 
politics in hindering/promoting development of financial markets. 
2 The recent international studies include Black (2001) and Black, Jang, and Kim (2002), who demonstrate a 
strong relation between corporate governance and firm valuation in Russia and Korea; Doidge, Karolyi, and 
Stulz (2003), who show that foreign firms listed on U.S. stock markets are valued higher; and Klapper and Love 
(2003), who use CLSA data to document a positive relation between firm valuation and corporate governance 
similar to ours. A partial list of the U.S. data based studies includes Bhagat and Brickley (1984), Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), Bhagat and Jefferis (1991), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick 
(2003). See Denis and McConnell (2003) for a more complete list and recent review of the literature.  
3 Although the above derivations assume non-negative e, it is easy to show that all the results hold with negative 
e.  
4 Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) obtain a similar result under a more restrictive set of assumptions. 
5 Anecdotal evidence supporting CLSA’s claim of objectivity is a report that CLSA has “lost quite a bit of 
corporate finance business” with companies that were assigned the worst corporate governance scores and that 
CLSA may stop compiling the scores. (South China Morning Post: Hong Kong; Nov 2, 2001). 
6 The regression is:  
COMP = 0.16×TRAN + Σi di + Σc dc      R
2 = 0.46, 
                 [0.05] 
where di and dc are industry and country dummies (coefficients not reported), respectively, R
2 is the coefficient 
of determination, and the number inside brackets is the probability level at which zero coefficient can be 
rejected.  Industries are classified into 13 groups as in Campbell (1996). 
7 We exclude countries with only one or two firms in computing the average spread and mean scores. 
8 We formally examine the relations between the within-country (conditional) variation in governance practices 
and the strength of legal framework using the Glejser (1969) test. It regresses the absolute values of fitted 
  35residuals of [S1] on LEGAL and control variables. The coefficient on LEGAL is negative and significant for all 
three measures of governance and transparency indicating that within-country variation in governance and 
disclosure practices is larger when legal environment is less investor-friendly. The results are not reported to 
conserve space and are available upon request from the authors. 
9  The external financing need of a firm growing at g percent a year can be expressed as  
g*Assets – (1+ g)*Earnings*b,         
where  b  is the proportion of the firm’s earnings retained for reinvestment. The first term is the required 
investment, and the second term is the internally available capital for investment. Because assets not financed 
by debt must be financed by equity, the first term becomes g*E, where E is the book value of equity. Assuming 
that the firm does not pay out dividends (b = 1), the sustainable growth rate is obtained as ROE / (1- ROE) by 
setting the external financing need equal to 0.  See Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) for additional 
assumptions/restrictions required for the derivation. 
10 When there is no shareholder that meets the ten percent cutoff point, we use the largest shareholder’s cash 
flow rights for OWN_CASH. 
11 The groups are petroleum (SIC 13, 29), consumer durables (SIC 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57), basic industry (SIC 8, 
10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33), food and tobacco (SIC 20, 21, 54), construction (SIC 15, 16, 17, 32), capital goods 
(SIC 34, 35, 38, 39), transportation (SIC 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47), textiles and trade (SIC 22, 23, 51, 53, 56, 59), 
services (SIC 7, 73, 75, 80, 82, 83, 87, 96), leisure (SIC 27, 58, 70, 79), unregulated utilities (SIC 48), regulated 
utilities (SIC 49), and financials (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67).  
12 Interestingly, La Porta, et al. (2002) find no valuation effect of ADR listing for firms in civil law countries 
and a small positive effect for common law countries.  
13 We estimate the selection equation using all companies covered in Worldscope for our sample countries that 
have sales data, the proxy for size, in either 1999 or 2000. There are 5,466 and 8,260 such companies for 
countries covered by CLSA and S&P, respectively. The coefficient on SIZE in the selection equation is positive 
and significant in all specifications, indicating that larger firms are more likely to be included in CLSA and 
S&P samples. 
  3614 A similar approach is used by Lins (2003) to address endogeneity problems arising in the relation between 
ownership and valuation. 
15 Data availability for ALPHA and BETA from Worldscope yield 302 and 296 firms for CLSA and S&P 
samples, respectively. 
16  The overall results are similar to those reported earlier. However, in Table II coefficients on 
INV_OPP*LEGAL and EXT_FIN*LEGAL with PROTECT as the dependent variable are negative but not 
significant at the conventional level (p-val = 0.22 and 0.30, respectively). In Table IV, the coefficient on 
CORP_GOV*LEGAL becomes insignificant (p-val = 0.17) when COMP is used as a proxy for firm governance. 
17 See Johnson and Shleifer (2000) for a literature review on the debate concerning the Coase argument in 
corporate governance. 
18 We obtain equation [B4] because I is given and ∫ − + = − + =
I
I I dj j MV
0
2 2 / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( π π ; hence,  0 / = ∂ ∂ d MV .  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Country Random-Effects Regressions of CLSA Governance and S&P Transparency Scores on 
Investment Opportunities, External Financing Needs, Legal Regimes, and Control Variables 
 
This table reports the results of country random-effects regressions: 
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where c indexes country; i indexes industry; and j indexes firm. α is a constant, E[εj
c] = 0, E[εj
c εk
c] ≠ 0 ∀ j and k, and E is the expectation operator. CORP_GOV 
is one of CLSA corporate governance scores (COMP, PROTECT, or SOCIAL) or S&P transparency ranking (TRAN) in 2000; d are industry dummies (coefficients 
are not reported); INV_OPP (investment opportunities) is 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average of growth rate in net sales (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th 
percentile); EXT_FIN (external financing needs) is the difference between 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average growth rate in total assets minus 1998-to-
2000 two-year geometric average maximum sustainable growth rate, where the latter is equal to ROE / (1 – ROE), and ROE (return on equity) is net income over 
book value of  equity (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); LEGAL is INVESTOR × ENFORCE, where INVESTOR is the anti-director index and ENFORCE is 
rule of law; INV_OPP *LEGAL and EXT_FIN *LEGAL are interaction terms for investment opportunities and external financing needs with the quality of legal 
environment, respectively. Zs are control variables: SIZE is log of sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by 
sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; EXPORT is export scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; ADR is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm’s 
shares are listed on U.S. stock exchanges in either 1999 or 2000, and zero, otherwise; and CONSOL is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm consolidates its 
financial statements, and zero, otherwise.  Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. 
Coefficients significant at least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are in boldface. Firms that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 
67) are excluded from the sample. We drop firms from the sample if they do not have one of the following items in a given year of interest: total assets, sales, 
book value of equity, or net income. If all items, except R&D expenditures and export, are available, we set those two equal to zero.  
 
Dependent  Variables: CLSA Governance and S&P 
Transparency Scores  COMP PROTECT  TRAN SOCIAL
INV_OPP  14.089 21.270  35.737  6.421 
  (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.44) 
EXT_FIN  4.363 16.223  9.154  -9.900 
  (0.08) (0.01)  (0.14)  (0.09) 
LEGAL  0.490 1.013  0.352  -0.091 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.49) 
INV_OPP *LEGAL  -0.525 -0.579  -1.125  -0.466 
  (0.00) (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.16) 
EXT_FIN *LEGAL  -0.083  -0.443  -0.302 0.258 
  (0.24) (0.04)  (0.19)  (0.25) 
SIZE  0.879 -3.325  1.235  1.137 
  (0.08) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.24) 
R&D  19.874 -22.812  12.503  139.853
  (0.59) (0.78)  (0.62)  (0.05) 
EXPORT  -6.240  0.943  -13.629  9.981 
  (0.09) (0.91)  (0.00)  (0.17) 
ADR  6.668  2.576 0.553  2.142 
  (0.00) (0.51)  (0.71)  (0.54) 
CONSOL  6.420  4.333  3.653 -12.992
  (0.00) (0.24)  (0.05)  (0.00) 
Wald-test statistics of overall significance  101.10 92.570  124.92  50.82 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.240 0.224  0.231  0.137 
Number of Companies  344 344  439  344 Table III 
Country Random-Effects Regressions of CLSA Governance and S&P Transparency Scores on 
Ownership Concentration, Legal Regimes, and Control Variables 
      
This table reports the results of country random-effects regressions: 
CORP GOV OWN CASH OWN CASH WEDGE LEGAL




















__ ( _ )
_ ,
=+∗ +∗ +∗ +∗ +












            
, 
where c indexes country; i indexes industry; and j indexes firm. α is a constant, E[εj
c] = 0, E[εj
c εk
c] ≠ 0 ∀ j and k, and E is the expectation operator. 
CORP_GOV is one of CLSA corporate governance scores (COMP, PROTECT, or SOCIAL) or S&P transparency ranking (TRAN) in 2000; d are 
industry dummies (coefficients are not reported); OWN_CASH is the share of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder, defined as in Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) in 1996; (OWNER_CASH)
2 is a squared term for cash flow ownership; WEDGE is a dummy variable, equal to one if 
CONTROL - OWN_CASH ≥ 10% and zero, otherwise, where CONTROL is the share of voting rights held by the largest shareholder defined as in 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) in 1996; LEGAL is INVESTOR × ENFORCE, where INVESTOR is the anti-director index and ENFORCE is 
rule of law; OWN_CASH*LEGAL is the interaction term for the share of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder with the quality of legal 
environment. Zs are control variables: SIZE is log of sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by 
sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; EXPORT is export scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; ADR is a dummy variable, equal to one if a 
firm’s shares are listed on U.S. stock exchanges in either 1999 or 2000, and zero, otherwise; and CONSOL is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm 
consolidates its financial statements, and zero, otherwise.  Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero 
coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are in boldface. Panel B excludes firms 
that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67). We drop firms from the sample if they do not have sales or ownership information in a 
given year of interest. If all items, except R&D expenditures and export, are available, we set those two equal to zero.   
 
 
  Panel A: Financial firms are included  Panel B: Financial firms are excluded 









OWN_CASH  0.575 1.691  0.192 -0.595 0.481 1.477  0.190 -1.071 
  (0.04)  (0.01) (0.15) (0.26) (0.11) (0.03) (0.21) (0.11) 
(OWN_CASH)
2  -0.005 -0.015  -0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.014  -0.001  0.009 
  (0.05)  (0.01) (0.12) (0.30) (0.13) (0.02) (0.17) (0.10) 
WEDGE  -0.829  -8.640  -0.803 1.371 0.141 -7.066 0.747 -0.871 
  (0.70)  (0.08) (0.69) (0.74) (0.95) (0.21) (0.76) (0.87) 
LEGAL  0.864 1.447  0.599 -0.220  0.816 1.491 0.588 -0.350 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) 
OWN_CASH *LEGAL  -0.010  -0.030  -0.005 0.017 -0.006 -0.026 -0.004 0.022 
  (0.18)  (0.08) (0.25) (0.24) (0.49) (0.17) (0.38) (0.23) 
SIZE  1.085 -1.973  0.411 1.804  -0.857  -6.847  0.261 0.585 
  (0.12)  (0.22) (0.42) (0.18) (0.33) (0.00) (0.66) (0.77) 
R&D  -92.774 -546.453  22.817 -71.505 -120.102  -602.535  29.295 -63.469
  (0.49)  (0.08) (0.52) (0.78) (0.36) (0.04) (0.40) (0.83) 
EXPORT  -0.388 13.545  -24.857 6.594 0.734  17.700  -25.405 7.756 
  (0.95)  (0.38) (0.00) (0.61) (0.91) (0.23) (0.00) (0.60) 
ADR  4.515  -8.561 -1.962 11.907 7.045 -6.147 -3.972 15.792 
  (0.28)  (0.38) (0.45) (0.14) (0.12) (0.55) (0.18) (0.12) 
CONSOL  2.442 4.567  0.238 -8.333  -1.296  -4.429  3.112  -2.656 
  (0.54)  (0.62) (0.95) (0.28) (0.77) (0.66) (0.49) (0.79) 
Wald-test statistics of joint significance  3307.560 1049.20 3670.91 1601.170 1001.140  860.380  1000.160 992.150
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.442  0.326  0.344 0.118 0.500 0.461 0.391 0.127 
Number of Companies   173  173 240  173 124  124 177 124 Table IV 
Country Random-Effects Regressions of Firm Valuation on CLSA Governance and S&P 
Transparency Scores, Legal Regimes, and Control Variables 
 
This table reports the results of country random-effects regressions: 
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where c indexes country; i indexes industry; and j indexes firm. α is a constant, E[εj
c] = 0, E[εj
c εk
c] ≠ 0 ∀ j and k, and E is the expectation operator.  Q is 2000-to-
2001 two-year average of Tobin’s Q defined as total assets plus market value of equity less book value of equity over total assets, where the market value of 
equity is the number of common shares outstanding times year-end share price (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); CORP_GOV is one of CLSA corporate 
governance scores (COMP, PROTECT, or SOCIAL) or S&P transparency ranking (TRAN) in 2000; d are industry dummies (coefficients are not reported); LEGAL 
is INVESTOR × ENFORCE, where INVESTOR  is the anti-director index and ENFORCE is rule of law; CORP_GOV * LEGAL is the interaction term for 
CORP_GOV with the quality of legal environment. Zs are control variables: INV_OPP (investment opportunities) is 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average of 
growth rate in net sales (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); SIZE is log of sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; R&D is research and development 
expenditures scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; EXPORT is export scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; ADR is a dummy variable, equal 
to one if a firm’s shares are listed on U.S. stock exchanges in either 1999 or 2000, and zero, otherwise; and CONSOL is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm 
consolidates its financial statements, and zero, otherwise.  Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be 
rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are in boldface. Firms that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 
63, 65, 67) are excluded from the sample. In Panel B we exclude the governance and disclosure scores and the interaction terms for governance and disclosure 
scores with legal regime. We drop firms from the sample if they do not have one of the following items in a given year of interest: sales, total assets, book value of 
equity, number of common shares outstanding, or year-end share price. If all items, except R&D expenditures and export are available, we set those two equal to 
zero. Coefficients on CORP_GOV and CORP_GOV * LEGAL are multiplied by 100.  
  Panel A  Panel B 
Dependent variable  Tobin’s Q 
COMPOSITE  1.950  - -  - - 
  (0.06)       
PROTECT  -  1.711 -  -  - 
    (0.05)      
TRAN  -  -  0.905 -  - 
     (0.04)     
SOCIAL  -  - -  0.436  - 
       (0.44)   
LEGAL  0.010  0.005 0.016  0.001 0.017 
  (0.67)  (0.75) (0.20)  (0.99) (0.00) 
CORP_GOV *LEGAL  -0.026 -0.012  -0.006  0.030  - 
  (0.10)  (0.12) (0.00)  (0.19)   
INV_OPP  0.820  0.840 0.843  0.888 0.854 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE  -0.104 -0.074  -0.113 -0.098  -0.087 
  (0.02)  (0.11) (0.00)  (0.03) (0.06) 
R&D  5.711  6.371 5.075  4.292  6.147 
  (0.09)  (0.06) (0.01)  (0.20) (0.07) 
EXPORT  1.795  1.629 1.226  1.479 1.625 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
ADR  -0.137 -0.081 -0.037  -0.044 -0.069 
  (0.41)  (0.62) (0.76)  (0.79) (0.67) 
CONSOL  -0.513 -0.422  0.104 -0.228 -0.404 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.47)  (0.15) (0.01) 
Wald-test statistics of joint significance
 
1287.280 1248.080 1500.73 1330.270 1239.530 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.344  0.328 0.282  0.361 0.321 
Number of Companies  344  344 438  344 344 
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